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ABSTRACT   
In a context of an increasingly focus of market participants on short-term results rather than 
on innovation or sustainability of the firm, we question its extension to a special case of the 
private context: the private equity industry. Opposite to other researchers that use 
expropriation and short-termism as equals, we dig into the narrow line that separates both 
terms. We theorize about the concept of short-termism, offering an alternative vision.  In 
the second part of this project we use the financial statements of a sample of private equity 
buyouts in Spain from 2001 to 2011 to test five different scenarios (two of them 
corresponding to short-termism) and thus shed light into the impact of LBOs on the acquired 
firms’ performance. Results provide support on the presence of expropriation, in contrast 
with the arguments claimed by the private equity official narrative.   
KEYWORDS:  Short-termism, Expropriation, Leveraged Buyouts, Private Equity.   
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1. INTRODUCTION  
  
A period of financial firms seeking short-term profit careless of the long-term consequences 
preceded the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The presence of short-termism is a current topic 
that the global economy and the Spanish one in particular might be suffering; it can desolate 
firms and the economy in general (Dallas, 2012).   
My interest in accounting and finance has allowed me to consider not only the benefits that 
these disciplines provide, but also their drawbacks, and undoubtedly, short-termism is one 
of them. It leads to insufficient investment in improving the long-term performance of the 
company because practices with the aim of boosting companies’ share price, revenues and 
profits are preferred to those concerned on quality, innovation and sustainability of the firm. 
Bearing in mind, however, that short-termism has been always considered a “market” issue 
and that in Spain there are not many publicly-held firms, we have focused our study on the 
private context. This allows us to better appreciate the extent to which short-termism might 
be affecting our country.    
The purpose of this project is to deep in the concept of short-termism not only in the public 
market but also in the private context, especially emphasizing the analysis in the private equity 
industry. Short-termism has been always attached to the market given the pressure that 
managers face from activist investors and analysts that make most of their decisions based 
on short-term indicators. Considering both that private firms do not suffer this pressure and 
that the statistics show that they invest much more than public firms in long-term 
investments (Asker, Farre-Mensa & Ljungqvist, 2011), we should expect that managers in 
private companies offered a more long-term oriented view. Nonetheless, there might be 
reasons why short-termism affects the private context too.   
The private equity industry, in particular, has been the subject of intense criticism for similar 
reasons, namely, for expropriation and short-termism. In leveraged buyouts (LBOs from now 
on), which nowadays represent the largest share of private equity investments in the 
European Union (Ughetto, 2012), companies are acquired by specialized investment firms 
using a relatively small portion of equity and a relatively large portion of outside debt 
financing (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2008). Even though the arguments of the industry’s official 
narrative highlight the advantages of both concentrated ownership and high debt to create 
value for the company, there is also great concern on the potentially negative effects of these 
transactions.   
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Major cutbacks in investment and employment documented in LBOs are alleged to 
compromise the long-run competitive position of a firm in order to increase short-run cash 
flows (Ayash, 2018). Research has so far been done to provide evidence on the adverse 
effects that LBOs imply to acquired companies but often, expropriation and short-termism 
terminology are interchangeably used.   
We further study the limits between expropriation and short-termism in private equity as we 
present a comparison between both strategies. Short-termism is concerned on signaling 
operating indicators until exit so as to benefit from a higher exit price whereas expropriation is 
more related to cash generation with a lower aim in signaling because less concerns on the 
exit price exist. Cash funneling during the holding period would be enough for the private 
equity fund to benefit from the LBO.   
Namely, we deep into the Spanish private equity industry and we theorize on different 
scenarios that might arise. Consistent with our own vision, we describe two different 
scenarios for short-termism and one for wealth expropriation. We also include two favorable 
scenarios that sum up the five hypotheses tested. We use a sample of 358 Spanish firms that 
have been acquired by private equity funds in leveraged buyouts transactions between 2000 
and 2011.   
By applying the value generation framework of Berg & Gottschalg (2005) and with the 
intention of providing evidence regarding which of the five scenarios defined takes place, we 
track operational measures from two years pre-acquisition to at most five years 
postacquisition. We use 7 outcome variables to examine LBOs that include primarily 
operating performance and profitability measures, investment and working capital 
management measures. These estimates show that the expropriation hypothesis is not 
rejected so we can conclude that no operational improvement is achieved in these companies. 
Results provide evidence on the limits that the actions behind expropriation present too. The 
official narrative of the private equity industry Jensen (1986) is therefore contradicted.  
The remainder of the project proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
background of the origins of short-termism in the market, Section 3 questions its limitation 
to just publicly-held companies and Section 4 focus the presence of short-termism in a special 
case of the private scene: the private equity industry. In Section 5 we define the five potential 
scenarios and describe the framework under which those scenarios are going to be studied. 
Sections 6 and 7 include the data and methodology used and the empirical results are 
displayed in section 8. A final discussion is presented in section 9.   
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2. SHORT-TERMISM. ITS ORIGINS IN THE MARKET.  
  
The focus of companies in the short-term rather than in longer and more sustainable 
profitable investments is a constant in public stock markets. Given that public companies 
are the most important ownership model in economies such as these of the USA, northern 
Europe or Japan (Johnson, Whittington & Scholes, 2011), it is more common to find 
shorttermist behavior in those geographic areas.   
According to a survey by Graham, Harvey, and Rajpogal (2005) that involved 400 U.S 
executives, management teams center their attention on short-term earnings and feel pressed 
to meet earnings benchmarks with the purpose of building credibility and external reputation, 
increasing or at least maintaining stock price. Managers admit that they would be willing to 
delay advertising expenditure or profitable long-term projects in order to meet investors’ 
expectations. These expectations are made with increasingly shorter views.   
Activist investors or shareholder activists as they usually called themselves, are those that often 
penalize firms when they go for profitable but long-term oriented investments (Bøhren, 
Priestley & Ødegaard, 2005). They mostly search for short-term profits. Carl Icahn, one of 
Wall Street’s most successful investors (Forbes, 2019), is a good example of this group. Since 
the moment Apple announced it would pay off investors with $17 billion, this man promptly 
began to buy Apple stock (Foroohar, 2016) notwithstanding that the company’s R&D 
investment was falling. Activist investors seek high-profile firms with abilities to boost share 
prices and have less interests in long-term related indicators.    
Warren Buffet, who is considered one of the most valuable investors of all times, is 
nonetheless a representation of a different type of investors. He has several times stated that 
he looks for businesses that will continue to have a competitive advantage in the long-term 
(CNBC, 2018). He even suggested the avoidance of quarterly reporting to prevent managers 
from focusing so heavily in the short-term. Overall, investors of this sort appreciate firm’s 
decisions beyond those that just focus on more immediate results.   
But what exactly is short-termism, and which consequences do short-termist strategies imply?  
Short-termism consists of an exaggerate focus of corporate managers, investors and analysts 
on the short-term results without being concerned on long-term value creation (Dallas, 
2012). The first and most obvious implication of short-termism is the insufficient investment 
in projects that can lead to better long-term performance of the company. In other words, 
practices with the purpose of increasing companies’ share price, revenues, gross and 
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operating profits, productivity and return on capital are preferred to those that are concerned 
about quality, innovation, employee’s skills and training, brand reputation or social 
responsibility. In short, sustainability of the firm.   
Financialization has become today’s face of capitalism trough changes in various parts of the 
economy. At the company level, it is linked to the shareholder model approach to corporate 
governance, the model that gained momentum in the US and the UK from the 1980s on. It 
encourages financialization of the company by maintaining that the purpose of its existence 
is to maximize the value of its shares rather than its long-term profits (ITUC, 2017). Other 
strategies also common in this corporate model are active use of debt, organizational 
restructuring and share buy-backs. Clearly influenced by this model, the primary duty of 
management is to maximize shareholder returns (Smith, 2003).   
Companies, however, are much more than just shareholders and that is the main reason why 
an alternative model of governance was founded: the stakeholder model.  Stakeholders can be 
defined as a group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
organizational objectives (Freeman, 1984). Therefore, all stakeholders are essential for the 
performance of the firm, not only shareholders. Some of the common practices that are 
positively regarded by shareholders and thereby the ones usually chosen by management, do 
not consider stakeholders’ interests though. This is critical since short-term oriented actions, 
usually taken to please shareholders, penalize the rest of the stakeholders and with them, the 
long-term sustainability of the firm. Some of these operations include “skimping on 
investment, exorbitant pay, high leverage, silly takeovers, accounting shenanigans and a craze 
for share buy-backs” as a result of shareholder value thinking (Forbes, 2017).   
A good illustration of the pressure managers receive from activist investors is what happens 
to big companies like Microsoft, Pfizer or IBM when they announce new investments (e.g. 
the expansion to PC business that IBM carried out in 2004). The market reaction to these 
long-term oriented decisions is, in general, an immediate decrease in the share price. On the 
contrary, when embarking on short-term oriented practices (e.g. Microsoft embarked on a 
buyback process that same year) the response of investors is notable different. These are 
examples of how the market penalizes companies that focus their decision making in longrun 
projects disregarding the fact that the nature of their activities makes them indispensable to 
engage in such investments.   
Capital markets are not currently the important source of inspiration for innovation that they 
are supposed to be. A “financialization” mindset, characterized by being a short-term view, 
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both prevents the economic growth and ensures just that rich people get richer. That is bad 
not only for those at the bottom, but for all of us. Research proves that more inequality leads 
to poorer health outcomes, lower level of trust, more violent crime, and less social mobility 
(Foroohar, 2016).   
Apart from the activist investors, managers feel also pressure from market intermediaries 
such as analysts. Directors wish to please them because their recommendations can be very 
influential with investors’ decisions.  Research has found that firms engage in earnings 
management to achieve analysts’ targets (Richardson, Teoh & Wysocki, 2004). On account 
of this, executives will adapt their decisions to achieve good analysts’ reviews. Yet, this is not 
the sole issue regarding analysts; these might also be induced to issue their reports with a 
short-term oriented view. As shown in the dot-com crash of the early 2000s, in which many 
participants were to blame, financial analysts were recommending buying shares although 
they were well aware that those companies were overvalued (Palepu, 2017). Why did they 
then give such purchase recommendations? There is no doubt that they were blinded by the 
short-term.   
In parallel and with the purpose of aligning management incentives with these activist 
investors and analysts’ desires, new forms of compensation have emerged in the last decades such 
as payments based on stock options programs or on accounting-based performance 
measures, creating a model that links incentive compensation with performance (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990).   
Proponents of stock options claim that this form of compensation generates incentives for 
managers to artificially and temporarily maximize shareholder value. They provide managers 
with stimulus to understate or inflate earnings depending on the timing of the execution of 
the option (Palepu, 2017). These new forms of compensation create additional motivations 
for managers to work against long-term decision as it is simple to modify their decisions 
regarding the attractiveness that focusing on the stock option window presents for them. 
Oversized incomes have incentivized young people to work on Wall Street rather than in 
more socially productive venues; the prevalent forms of remuneration and tax incentives 
have led to excessive focus on short-term profits (Epstein & Montecino, 2016).  
In part related with stock options, buybacks are a mechanism increasingly used by firms that 
might also induce to short-termism. Goldman Sachs estimated that in 2018 corporate stock 
buybacks would hit a record of one trillion dollars that year, jumping 51% from last year’s 
mark (NBR, 2018). In those shares repurchase processes, the company pays cash to buy its 
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own shares in the stock market and therewith the number of shares outstanding is reduced 
(Bodie, Merton & Cleeton, 2012). Jeff Cox (2019) claims that if current conditions persist, 
corporations are likely this year to inject more than $2.5 trillion into what UBS strategists 
term "flow" - the combination of share buybacks, dividends, and mergers and acquisitions 
activity.  
Buybacks are practices where excess cash of the company is used in strategies with no direct 
longer-term focus. This cash could have been used to pay higher wages or to invest in 
research, infrastructures, workers’ skills or product development. Still, what are the actual 
reasons behind these practices?  
Foroohar (2016) considers buybacks as the last choice of a company when it knows that 
there is nothing else to do to keep high prices when prosperous times are about to end. A 
proof of this is that historically, when buybacks peak, they are followed by slower growth. 
The immediate consequence of a buyback is the increase in the earnings per share because 
of the decrease in the number of outstanding shares (see Figure 1). In periods of slow growth, 
it seems to be a good option so as to feign better results and satisfy investors. However, 
although there is an increase in earnings per share, there does not have to be movement in 
profits at all and that is what most of the time actually happens. The rise in corporate stock 
buybacks that have taken place concurrently over last decades clearly reflects a short-termist 
behavior of companies trading publicly.   
Figure 1: How buybacks add value  
 
Source: Taken from UBS  
Another way a corporation can distribute cash to its shareholders is by paying a cash dividend 
(Bodie, Merton & Cleeton, 2012). Dividends can also represent a short-termist strategy 
depending on the circumstances in which they are declared. It is obvious that shareholders 
are risking some of their money when they invest in a company and, as a result, they should 
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expect to receive something in exchange. Yet, when companies invest all their excess cash in 
rewarding those investors instead of, at least, using part of it in more long-term oriented 
investments, we consider that there is a clear sign of short-termism. Even more serious are 
cases like Apple, one of the world’s most valuable corporation, that in 2013 borrowed $17 
billion in order to pay dividends (Foroohar, 2016). It is surprising that a firm selling 
thousands or even millions of devices and with enough cash sitting in the bank, asks for debt 
with absolutely financial rather than operational objectives. There is no doubt that Apple did 
not need that money to develop a new product or to build new plants, it needed it to persuade 
investors by repurchasing stock or by paying higher dividends and thereby the company’s 
strategy is tremendously short-term oriented.  
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) also represent a practice subject to short-termism that is 
achieving record levels. M&As frequently grab the headlines as they involve large sums of 
money and very public competitions for shareholder support (Johnson, Whittington & 
Scholes, 2011). Takeovers usually seek to quickly increase a company’s market share and/or 
achieve cost-cutting trough economies of scale. Although the intentions are valid, it is neither 
an easy choice nor a natural process. Inorganic growth can be dangerous if the due diligence 
process is not thoroughly performed as they sacrifice the company sustainability in their 
hurry to rapidly improve. According to a recent Harvard Business Review (2018), the failure 
rate for M&A sits between 70 and 90 percent, suggesting the complexity and risks that these 
transactions face.   
The multinational information technology company HP acquired the UK software firm, 
Autonomy, in 2011 for $11.1 billion and one year later it wrote down more than $5 billion 
because of “serious accounting improprieties, misrepresentation and disclosure failures” 
practiced by Autonomy (Forbes, 2012). HP justified the high price paid for Autonomy due 
to the prosperity of the forecasts made with the information that Autonomy provided with 
to HP. Another example is the case of the magnate Warren Buffett admitting having overpaid 
for Kraft’s merger with Heinz (Financial Times, 2019). Although these two examples have 
clear differences, both show how overpayment 1  is present in these transactions. Even 
rational investors as Warren Buffet usually looking for long-term sustainability may fail due 
to fact that the hard, time-consuming and extremely needed due diligence process are not 
thoroughly performed.   
                                                 
1 The majority of people consider that overpayment is just paying a high price. However, overpayment is 
paying above (i.e. paying for things with no value and that would not imply future benefits for the company).  
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Inorganic growth through M&As can represent a signal of pressure to show results or 
pretending to be well performing at once. Such a huge investment, if not appropriate can 
lead to different drawbacks for the company because of the difficulties that joining two 
different firms have. The company context, culture, organizational structure… can vary so 
heavily that the merger can easily end up in a big failure. For instance, as reported in a news 
from the BBC, the merger between HP and Compaq triggered a loss of 15,000 jobs. The 
result was a decrease in costs without an increase in profits. In short, that “quick” decision 
made to please investors and show good performance results, can have very negative 
consequences for the company in the long-term. This is therefore another example of an 
attempt to bolster margins focusing just on the cut short outcomes and these decisions are 
becoming more and more popular in public markets nowadays2.  
Today successful companies hoard cash with purposes other than operational. CNBC (2017) 
discusses whether having huge amounts of cash is considered a red flag. It suggests that big 
companies accumulating excess cash can be interpreted as lacking ideas for investment in the 
long-term performance of the organization. The case of Apple is even harder since not only 
it accumulates cash (not investing it in further research or in job creation and higher salaries), 
but it also borrows money which is not precisely used in innovation development (Foorohar, 
2016).   
Even though all this is licit (each firm can decide how they manage to continue successfully 
operating) there is no doubt that it is a much riskier strategy because it depends on more 
volatile aspects than an operational strategy to achieve faster results. What is more, 
Revelation Investment Research found that in big companies with large amounts of cash, 
the returns were even worse than those of companies with low amounts of cash on hand 
(CNBC, 2017). Hence, it can be inferred that a high volume of cash is not necessarily related 
to good performance. The relevant issue relies on how to use or funnel this excess cash into 
profitable investments that could help to improve the company in the longer-term.  
Outsourcing and other save-costing strategies could be also interpreted as a short-term oriented 
behavior. Although some defend that outsourcing allows companies to increase their 
performance by focusing on the things they do best (Quinn,1992), others argue that it might 
reduce innovation, transfer knowledge to supplier companies and reduce control on firms’ 
                                                 
2 Money spent on M&A’s represents almost two thirds of the whole amount of R&D spending by American 
firms (IRI, 2016).   
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activities, thereby destroying long-run competitive advantage (Bettis, Bradley & Hamel 1992). 
Outsourcing can therefore lead to a decrease in R&D competitiveness because it is a 
substitute for innovation.   
Much the same with outsourcing strategies, other tactics with the aim of saving costs penalize 
the long-term performance of the company. An illustrative example of this is the permanent 
decline in market share value, revenues and assets that Xerox suffered due to a replacement 
in its top-selling copiers from high-quality material to plastic one (Foroohar, 2016). This 
example shows how some strategic decisions that might seem adequate at first sight, can 
have harmful implications for the company sustainability and success. Given that short-term 
good results can easily become a completely failure in the future, special attention should 
management place to these settlements.   
Accounting plays an important role for understanding the motivations of managers’ decisions 
too. It is a fact that most of the times, long-term oriented investments such as R&D, brand 
reputation or advertising have a negative impact in the short-term. Due to the great influence 
that the prudence concept 3  exerts in accounting standards (i.e. IFRS and US GAAP) 
investment efforts are forced to be recognized as an increase in expenses rather than in assets, 
without an immediate positive consequence in revenues. As an illustration, international 
accounting rules such as IAS 38, that deals with intangible assets prohibit the capitalization 
of research expenditures. IAS 38.54 states “Charge all research cost to expense”. Besides, 
IAS 38.57 explains “Development costs are capitalized only after technical and commercial 
feasibility of the asset for sale or use have been established.” As a result of accounting 
standards, the net income of the company the year those investments are made, is penalized 
because the vast majority will appear in the company’s income statement as expenses rather 
than as capitalized assets. Therefore, operating results of companies depend greatly on the 
scope of the decisions being made which at the same time depend on how accounting 
standards define the accounting rules. H&M gross margin, for instance, decreased to a 58,8 
percent in 2014 as a result of broadening its product range and investing more on information 
technologies (Palepu, 2017)4.  
                                                 
3 According to the prudence concept, the amount of revenues recognized should not be overestimated and 
the amount of expenses should not be underestimated. It implies that companies be conservative in 
recognizing assets and not underestimate liabilities.   
4 Nowadays H&M is suffering a lot because of the lack of digital investments. Its current tendency is a 
decrease in sales since people wants to buy digitally and this company lacks the required inversion (probably 
because it will affect its short-term results).    
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As investors are prone to study the performance of the company by considering those 
indicators and their investing decisions will be made accordingly, managers fear to take risks 
in that sense. Despite these inconveniences, managers should take into consideration that 
those investment decisions will result in better results for the company afterwards and they 
should be able to defend this. At the end, the management team is the one making decisions 
and they should look for the best to the company and not just for the benefits of some. As 
the former CEO of Spectris, a company headquartered in UK, says in an interview in the 
LSE, it is also important to look for shareholders worried about the long-term of a company 
(LSE, 2019).   
In short, there is a tendency not to worry much about the performance of the company in 
terms of technologies, innovative capacity, social benefit or human capital development but 
instead to think more on the success of a company in reference to its ability to achieve high 
share prices and margins at the expense of all the other. This contradicts the idea that 
companies search for the long-term sustainability of the organization. Still, are all these 
shortterm oriented procedures applied so as to maximize shareholder value?   
3. IT IS SHORT-TERMISM EXCLUSIVE OF THE MARKET?   
  
3.1. Introduction  
  
Private companies invest nearly twice as much as public firms do in long-term investments 
such as R&D or workers training (Asker, Farre-Mensa & Ljungqvist, 2011). In fact, a research 
from Stanford University concludes that tech firms reduce innovation in 40 percent after an 
IPO arguing that once a company becomes public, it focuses on pleasing shareholders 
alternatively to investing it in the future profitability of the company (Bernsten, 2015). 
Relevant business people like Ren Zhengfei, the founder and CEO of Huawei, one of the 
leading companies in the telecommunications industry, argue that the vast majority of 
Huawei’s success comes from the fact that it is a privately-owned company not at the mercy 
of shareholders; it is free to decide its own vision of the future and act accordingly (BBC,  
2019). Contrary to its main rival, Apple, Huawei does not have to pay much attention to 
short-term financial results and as a consequence, it is one of the five companies that invest 
more in R&D worldwide.  
Following these ideas, we would expect that managers in private companies offered a 
longterm orientation since they lack the pressure of activist investors. However, short-
termism might also be ingrained in the private scene. The lack of market pressure does not 
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imply that management in private companies might not have incentives towards short-term 
oriented strategies. There might be some forces that explain why short-termism can affect 
the private context as it does in publicly-held companies. Here are some instances.  
To begin with, even though new compensation schemes like stock options are more of a 
market thing, they are not exclusive of public companies. In the private scenario it is still 
possible to pay management based on accounting fundamentals. Managers might be 
motivated to increase their own compensation and therefore have similar incentives to show 
good results. When these motivations alter long-run investing decisions, we can consider that 
short-termism is present in private companies too.    
Even though private companies have more restricted access to public debt markets, private 
firms have leverage ratios that are approximately 50% higher than those of their public 
counterparts, which is suggestive of the difference in the financing behavior of both groups 
of companies (Brav ,2009). The leverage of private firms has increased compared to public 
firms (Medina, 2015) and it consists mostly of borrowing from banks (interest-bearing).  One 
of the usual characteristics of bank debt is the need to meet debt covenants. Despite the fact 
that covenants are ubiquitous in financial contracts such as public debt, private debt and 
private equity (Chava & Roberts, 2008), the use of accounting-based covenants in public debt 
has declined over the last century (Begley & Freedman, 2004).   
Following the classic definition of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Smith and Warner (1979), 
covenants give incentives to follow a value-maximizing strategy trough restriction to 
managerial behavior. Christensen and Nikolaev (2011) describe two different types of 
covenants, capital covenant and performance covenant. The most relevant to short-termism 
are performance covenants, namely, those that require a minimum profitability level since it 
is likely that they condition managers’ profit-related actions.   
When debt covenants are about to be reached, managers suffer pressure to increase earnings 
either to reduce the restrictiveness of accounting-based constraints in debt agreements or to 
avoid the costs of covenant violations (Beneish, 2001). Dichev and Skinner (2001) find an 
unusually small number of loans with financial measures just below covenant thresholds and 
an unusually large number of loans with financial measures at or just above covenant 
thresholds. This is clear evidence of private firms incurring in short-termist behavior as the 
mechanisms used to avoid the impending consequences will have a repercussion for the 
company in the long run. Earning managements practices may sort out short-term problems, 
but always revert in the future.   
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Earnings management is usually classified into two categories: accrual-based and real-based 
earning management. Both try to “mask” the true economic performance of the company 
but trough different means. The former consists of manipulating the discretion given by the 
accounting standards that are full of estimations and subjective situations. For instance, the 
recognition of a sale to a customer whose ability to pay is questionable. Even though the 
company would show higher earnings in that period, at some point in time the corresponding 
accounts receivables would need to be written off, altering the results and sustainability of 
the company. On the other hand, real-based management occurs when managers undertake 
transactions that deviate from the first best practice in order to alter reported earnings. 
Transactions that were it not for the existence of a debt covenant would have been carried 
out, are not performed.   
Although both could be employed to achieve the covenant thresholds, the second type makes 
it easier to see how managers adopt decisions without wondering about their longer-term 
consequences. Examples of real based earning managements include cutting R&D 
investment or to decrease selling prices with the only purpose of increasing income through 
sales volume. Both are actions that will sacrifice the future profitability and sustainability of 
the company.   
3.2. A special case in the private context: Private equity (PE)  
  
Even though broadly speaking the already presented mechanisms might take place in any 
private company, there is a case within the private context, the private equity industry, that 
has been subject of intense criticism for practices like expropriation and short-termism. 
Private equity firms take companies out of the market to avoid some of the pressures 
commented in section 2 but the truth is that alternative problems simultaneously arise in the 
companies they acquire.  
Private equity firms, managed by the so-called general partners (GP), raise large pools of 
capital from institutional investors (Limited partners, LP) who usually and temporarily 
undertake risky investments with the purpose of obtaining higher than average returns 
(Appelbaum & Batt, 2014). All decisions are guided and managed by the GPs although their 
monetary contribution and thus, their risk, is minimal. In general, the LPs are pension funds, 
wealthy individuals and other institutional investors that are the ones who provide most of 
the capital although they have little influence in its management (Stringham & Vogel, 2018).   
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Private equity is particularly relevant due to its increasing importance. A large and growing 
share of the economy is managed by the private equity industry (Ayash & Schütt, 2016).  
European private equity activities have suffered a spectacular increase as shown in Figure 1. 
A recent study published by the strategic consulting company Bain & Company shows that 
the capital gained by private equity funds has globally increased from $299 billion in 2010 to 
$527 billion in 2017. In 2018, it has even reached the levels of 2007, were a boom in the 
private equity industry took place and the expectations for 2019 are higher. In Spain, the 
quantity amounted to 3,087 million euros in 2017 (Fernández, 2018), that is also above the 
peak reached in the private equity boom that took place just before the economic crisis.   
Figure 1: European Private Equity Trends, 2013-2018  
 
Source: Private Equity Trend Report 2018, PWC.  
Most of the private equity acquisitions are done in the form of leveraged buyouts 
(Appelbaum & Batt, 2014). Even though private equity initially emerged in the form of 
venture capital, the reality that prevails nowadays is that LBOs funds are first class 
competitors in big corporative operations. An LBO is a transaction in which a group of 
private investors use debt financing to purchase a corporation or a corporate division 
(Palepu, 1990). The acquisition is usually assembled trough a special vehicle purpose (SPV) 
set up for the operation, the repayment of the debt depends exclusively on the cash flows 
generated by the acquired company and its assets are set as the guarantee that backs up the 
funding (Fernández, 2018).   
LBOs represent the largest share of private equity investments in the European Union 
(Ughetto, 2010). In Spain, leveraged buyouts represent the greatest fragment of private equity 
acquisitions. Companies being acquired in an LBO process increased from 8 in 2001 to 35 
between 2005 and 2007 on average (Fernández, 2018). Figure 2 shows the trend followed by 
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European buyouts during the last five-year period. Its increasing presence and the potential 
sources of short-termism that they imply, make them considerably interesting for the present 
study.    
Figure 2: European Buyout Trends, 2013-2018  
  
Source: Private Equity Trend Report 2018, PWC.  
The literature has studied the impact of private equity funds on their acquired companies and 
most studies defend a positive effect of LBOs on performance, especially in the first wave 
(from 1980 to 1989). Kaplan (1989) argues that LBOs are actual engines of growth both for 
small and medium-sized enterprises claiming that the companies experience an operating 
income and net cash flow increase.  
Jensen (1989) argues that LBOs generate economic efficiencies trough a superior governance 
framework (which can better align manager’s incentives to those of investors and 
shareholders) through high leverage, concentrated ownership and monitoring. Supporters of 
the LBO model state that the organizational changes connected to this type of transactions 
strengthen incentives for managers to maximize value to investors and make better 
investment decisions by cutting back wasteful investment. Baker and Wruck (1989) even 
claim that these organizational changes avoid or reduce the likelihood that improvements 
arise at the expense of long-term value.   
One of the benefits of a high debt level is that it reduces the “free cash flow” problem. Free 
cash flow is the cash in excess of that required to fund the projects with positive net present 
values (Jensen,1986). When managers have a lot of discretion about how and where to 
allocate a firm’s cash flow, there is a temptation to use it in projects that do not increase the 
wealth of shareholders (Bodie, Merton & Cleeton, 2012). Commitments to debt payment 
  18 
bring pressure to improve operational efficiency and eliminate investments that will not be 
profitable (Bacon, Wright, Meuleman & Scholes, 2012).   
Moreover, reductions in post-buyout corporate tax payments are also frequently suggested 
as a significant source of wealth gains to investors from LBOs trough interest tax shields 
(Palepu, 1990). Tax savings provide a strong incentive for LBOs: by issuing high levels of 
debt, firms increase their interest tax deductions.   
4. SHORT-TERMISM (VS. EXPROPRIATION) IN PRIVATE EQUITY  
  
4.1. Why might PE managers have incentives to incur in short-termism?  
  
PE-owned companies show similarities with publicly-held companies in several ways. Both 
are under pressure to maximize short-term shareholder value and have an array of financial 
and organizational strategies to do this (Appelbaum & Batt, 2014). Not only do they have 
this pressure, but they sometimes pursue their aims more aggressively than public companies 
at the expense of other stakeholders of the company. Private equity funds are short-term 
investment vehicles in nature (Ayash, 2018).  Managers are forced to generate high fund 
returns in the shortest possible period. The duration of the investment holding period is 
therefore crucial to understanding the reasons behind short-termist oriented behaviors in 
private equity transactions.   
The success of private equity investments is mostly measured through the investment rate of 
return (IRR). Because of the concept of time value of money, most GPs aim to exit their 
private equity investments as soon as possible. An early exit goes a long way towards 
explaining superior investment return (Canderle, 2016). Target companies have to be turned 
around within a couple of years and the main objective of their existence is to deliver returns 
to their owners. All this will strongly influence the strategies and actions adopted by the 
managers of these funds.   
Large rates of returns are sometimes achieved through quick flips, what Phalippou (2017) 
describes as briefly held investments, confirming the short horizons that GPs have. The 
famous quick flip of TH Lee in 1992 stands as an illustration of the excessiveness in the 
duration and returns of some investments. It bought Snapple for $135 millions and sold it 
two years later to Quaker Oats for $1.7 billion (Phalippou, 2017). It is hard to believe that 
extremely short frames of time allow private equity companies to create the value and to 
provide the expertise and goodness that they claim.   
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The own structure of the funds and the compensation methods that characterize the private 
equity industry also stimulates short-termism. Because LBO funds are created with limited 
terms of approximately ten years, LBO sponsors must continually make cash distributions 
to their investors to raise successive investment funds (Ayash, Bartlett & Poulsen, 2017).  
When professionals raise funds, they are compensated according to a percentage of the 
money they have under management. However, they only receive that compensation if the 
money is put to work, that is, if a target company is purchased. Disbursements from the fund 
are made just as a fund liquidates its investments.   
Usually promises are made to the LPs about the timing to invest that money in and therefore, 
if that time frame goes by, there is a pressure to spend that money in whichever deal. For 
similar reasons, because commitments are done about the expected time to be holding a 
company, managers are sometimes pushed to sell their acquired companies almost at any 
price. This pressure to purchase, but above all the pressure to sell given the limited nature of 
the funds, could give rise to short-termism.   
Another reason why managers incur in short-termism is the pressure of the debt and the 
resulting change of structure, usually suffered with the LBO, called “structural break” (Ayash 
& Schütt, 2016). Private equity turns on its head the capital structure of the typical public 
corporation: the capital structure of a company acquired by a private equity fund is often 70 
percent debt and 30 percent equity (Appelbaum & Batt, 2014). The doubled or further 
multiplied debt LBO companies are loaded up with means that most resources have to be 
mobilized to pay off this debt.  It frequently means that they have to sell off otherwise 
productive assets or that they are simply left with trouble generating the revenues that are 
needed to repay this debt. That can force them to ditch long-term strategic imperatives in 
order to serve their creditors (ITUC, 1997).   
Even though an optimal debt ratio is necessary to achieve profitability levels, the trade-off 
theory (Myers, 1977) predicts that the amount of debt that a firm raises is a balance between 
the value creation of interest tax shields and the expected cost of financial distress. It is 
optimal for firms to raise additional debt until the marginal tax shield benefit of the additional 
dollar of debt equals the marginal increase in expected cost of financial distress (Myers, 1977). 
It is not certain, however, that the level of debt faced by LBO-acquired companies is in 
accordance with this theory.  The new capital structure after an LBO implies side-effects on 
long-term performance and sustainability. The controls arising from high leverage and 
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financial monitoring likely limit managerial discretion and stifle flexibility and risk taking 
(Ughetto, 2012).   
As previously mentioned, one of the arguments for this high leverage levels, is tax saving 
benefits. An opposite view is that the cost of capital is more or less independent of leverage, 
since the tax advantage of a high level of debt is almost entirely offset by the higher cost of 
that debt (Berg & Gottschalg, 2005). Tax benefits do not always compensate the interest 
burden that the company faces and that prevents it from long-term growth. More serious is 
the fact that all those tax savings are translated into less contributions to the country’s social 
welfare. The Danish Ministry of Taxation studied the issue for the year 2007 and evidenced 
that the Danish Government was losing crucial tax revenue due to the tax avoidance of 
foreign private equity firms (ITUC, 2007).  
Naturally, debt covenants are considerably present in private equity loan agreements and 
following prior rationales, they will also induce to short-termist behaviors. In 2007 private 
equity backed companies were focusing their strategies in meeting quarterly results due to 
the need of meeting some debt covenants rather than long-term value creation (Canderle, 
2012).  
4.2. Actions taken. Short-termism vs. Expropriation  
  
The aforementioned incentives not only induce managers to rely on short-termism, but they 
also might motivate expropriation strategies. Critics based on the presence of these two 
strategies and concerned on the potentially negative effects of LBOs (e.g. layoffs, reductions 
in wages, capital, and R&D investments) emerged among the media, trade unions and certain 
political sides. Research has also been done in this topic. Cohn, Mills & Towery (2012)’s 
results appear inconsistent with LBOs improving operating performance, either through the 
disciplining effects of leverage and concentrated ownership or trough operational expertise 
supplied by private equity acquirers.  
In most cases, previous literature has used interchangeably both terms (i.e. short-termism 
and expropriation), to contradict the official narrative of the private equity industry, because 
of the difficulty in drawing a line between the expropriation and short-termism scenarios. 
There is, however, a common concern: in both cases negative long-run effects occur on the 
acquired firms.   
Those who focus on expropriation usually refer to private equity managers finding ways of 
extracting wealth from the companies they take over. Managers frequently take up new loans 
  21 
to pay out dividends to themselves and engage in other dubious acts to cash in on their new 
ownership, like charging the companies large consultancy fees or lending out money to their 
companies at interests well above market rates (ITUC, 2007). Another source of cash is 
stripping assets. Management fees represent one of the most important focus of criticism, 
and a clear example of expropriation. The private equity fund managers get an annual 
management fee of 1-2% plus additional fees for each financial service they provide and 
when the portfolio company is sold, they assign themselves a percentage of the profit, 
oftentimes a 20%, known as carried interest. Given that the funds under management run 
into billions of dollars, these fees easily add up to hundreds of millions (IUF, 2007).   
The case of the largest and most famous toy retail company, Toys “R” Us, is an illustration 
of the consequences that these strategies cause in the acquired company. The group was 
acquired on July 2005 by an investment group formed by several investment firms and apart 
from the huge structural break that the firm suffered, the majority of the cash inflows 
resulting from the closure and sale of some of its stores, were employed in paying excessive 
management fees.  
Those that use the term short-termism to criticize private equity firms claim that they have little 
incentives to please long-term investment opportunities of PE-backed up companies; their 
rent- seeking behavior and short-term horizon allow them to quickly dismiss the necessary 
investments as long as the signal exist. Their main intention is to rise the value of the 
company as soon as possible to successfully exit the company. It is possible that such 
shortrun performance improvements come at the expense of long-run performance 
(Harford & Kolasinski, 2014).   
In our opinion expropriation and short-termism when applied to the PE case are not 
synonym terms and although narrow, the border line between them merits discussion.  
Harford & Kolasinski (2014) even note that the short-termism hypothesis is actually a variant 
of the wealth transfer hypothesis, indicative of the connection that both strategies might 
have.   
Applied to PE, short-termism could also be described as a strategy aimed to feign profitable 
results achieved through mechanisms that will end up harming the company because they 
are not sustainable in time. It gives rise to myopic behaviors as managers incurring in 
shorttermism seek to convince investors and other stakeholders about the goodness of 
decisions that do not really create long-term value for the acquired company. In short, it 
means to improve short-term performance trough signaling, allowing for a quick, profitable 
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exit. Signaling goes beyond cash generation and thus, indicators such as EBITDA are usually 
enhanced.  
With the purpose of achieving the desired levels in operating indicators before the exit takes 
place, different outcomes such as reducing productive investments and excessive cost-cutting 
might arise. The excessive levels of debt turn these outcomes (initially optimal) into an urgent 
necessity. All this leaves companies unable to weather tough times and allows private equity 
firms to make money even if things go wrong (Canderle, 2016).  
Cost-cutting strategies are needed to achieve short-term objectives and to generate the 
desired signal for EBITDA. They include major cutbacks in investment and employment, 
decreasing the quality of the materials, subcontracting processes and client neglect, among 
others. The short-term priorities of PE owners are in conflict with the long-term investments 
in research, development and other factors that are necessary for ensuring innovation and 
competitiveness (ITUC, 2007).  
Even though expropriation will also have long-term negative effects for the company, this 
strategy is mostly related to cash generation as wealth is typically transferred in the form of 
cash. It is more focused on benefiting from the engaged actions. When expropriation takes 
place, “intentional signaling” does not happen since there are no aims in pretending operating 
performance improvement because concerns over the exit price are much lower. The 
expropriation channels that PE funds employ during their period of control (e.g. 
management fees or dividend payments) are enough to benefit from the LBO without the 
need of selling the company at a very high price5. Metrick and Yasuda (2010) found that 
twothirds of the revenue gained by PE funds had their origin in components that were not 
sensitive to the performance of the acquired firm. Thus, the majority of the sponsor’s 
revenues do not depend on the difference between entry and exit price of the target company 
but on other channels not related to performance-related improvements.  
Practices such as cost-cutting or decrease in investments might be also used for expropriation 
purposes. In contrast with short-termism, the aim behind these decisions is not to hold a 
signal to maximize the exit price, but to generate as much and as quick cash as possible during 
the holding period. They seek mechanisms for cash generating which are generally more 
aggressive than those aiming signaling.   
                                                 
5 There are cases in which target firms file for bankruptcy, meaning that no benefits can be earned from the 
sale of the firm.   
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5. VALUE CREATION, EXPROPRIATION, SHORT-TERMISM OR 
GROWTH. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY  
  
The second part of this project presents an empirical analysis in which we study five scenarios 
that might emerge in private equity-backed companies. The first two scenarios have been 
already presented and are the value creation scenario (Scenario 1) argued by the official narrative 
(e.g. Jensen 1986) and the wealth expropriation scenario claimed by Harford & Kolasinski (2014) 
(Scenario 2). We separate our view of short-termism into two additional scenarios: signaling and 
exhaustion (Scenarios 3 and 4) and finally, we consider a fifth scenario which is opposite to 
short-termism that we refer to as the growth scenario (Scenario 5).  
When thinking about short-termism different situations can arise. Some would argue that 
short-termism exists when improvements in multiples, ratios and performance in general are 
achieved during the holding period (i.e. the period in which the private equity firm has been 
managing the company), but that are not sustainable once the deal finishes. They would only 
be a signal artificially held until with the purpose of maximizing the exit price. After the exit, 
it is difficult to assess whether private equity firms have adopted short-term oriented 
behaviors given that new owners enter that might influence the company’s performance.  
Either if a secondary buyout, an IPO or a M&A proceeds the deal, the success or failure of 
the company after the exit cannot be claimed to be just consequence of the PE management. 
There are no studies evaluating the target companies’ accounting-based performance after 
the LBO. Harford & Kolasinski (2014) test whether the well-documented high returns of PE 
sponsors result from wealth transfers and short-termism trough a pre-post exit analysis, but 
it is a market-based study6. Because of the difficulty in gathering information subsequent to 
the LBO we limit our analysis in the LBO years (i.e. the study ends up in the exit). This 
represents the third scenario under study, the signaling scenario.   
A different vision of short-termism is the one in which the signal is sent but disappears before 
the end of the holding period. In this case, signaling is also pursued but the actions taken are 
so short-term oriented that it is too difficult for the target company to hold the created signals 
until the exit. Therefore, if operational changes arise between the LBO and the exit (e.g. an 
increase in sales the first years that turns into a decrease or a lower increase since that moment 
onwards) we could conclude that the measures taken to obtain short-term gains are not 
                                                 
6 As an illustration, the market price and EBITDA of the British multinational retailer, Debenhams, 
immediately drop after the LBO.   
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enough to keep these results until exit. We refer to this circumstance as exhaustion and this is 
our fourth scenario (Scenario 4).  
We consider a final potential scenario, the growth scenario (Scenario 5). It is an opposite one to 
short-termism as efforts are made for the company to grow without no short-term rewards. 
Decisions that might harm the operating results in the first place but whose ultimate purpose 
is achieving a sustainable improvement in the performance evolution are preferred. We have 
left this scenario to the end because the own nature of the PE industry, makes it unlikely that 
PE funds sacrifice their returns in the benefit of the subsequent owners. Nonetheless, it is a 
possibility that could arise too, so we need to take it into account.   
We test five different hypotheses related to each of the aforementioned scenarios in order to 
contrast which is the one that actually occurs. The different hypotheses are summarized in 
Table 1.  
Table 1: Hypotheses   
Hypothesis 1: A value creation scenario following Jensen (1986) corresponds with the LBOs in the sample.  
Hypothesis 2: An expropriation scenario corresponds with the LBOs in the sample.  
Hypothesis 3: A signaling scenario corresponds with the LBOs in the sample.  
Hypothesis 4: An exhaustion scenario corresponds with the LBOs in the sample.  
Hypothesis 5: A growth scenario corresponds with the LBOs in the sample.  
Source: Own elaboration. Notes: From the five scenarios, just one will not be rejected.  
These five scenarios can be studied using the value generation framework of Berg and 
Gottschalg (2005), which is the result of a variety of value generation levers working together 
in a complex process. This framework, which follows a Shareholder Value Model perspective 
focuses on a combination of intrinsic value created and other external factors like multiples 
or negotiation abilities. Even though the final objective of the framework is shareholder value 
creation, it allows to discern whether there is also value creation for the target company, and 
therefore, for its stakeholders.  
Intrinsic value is the difference between value creation and value expropriation during the 
period studied. If we split it up into the three possible functions that contribute to it: 
operating, financing and strategic, we have the following formula:  
IVE – IVEN = VCRE – VEXP = VCREFIN – VCREFIN + VCREOP – VEXPOP  VCRSTRAT  
Considering the time and amount of detail that carrying out a study on the three different 
levers would imply, and given that we believe that the operating and strategic functions are 
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the ones more relevant to discern between the five scenarios is in place, the aforementioned 
formula is reduced to:  
VCREOP – VEXPOP  VCRSTRAT  
We test the difference between this vision of intrinsic value before and after the LBO 
considering also the distance in years with the LBO (t0). Given that our aim is to prove 
whether which one of the five scenarios aforementioned described prevails, we need to 
distinguish between the first two years after the LBO (t1, t2) and from this point forward (t3,  
t4, t5).   
6. DATA  
  
6.1. Sample description  
  
To analyze the presence of short-termist behavior in LBO transactions we use a dataset 
created by a research team from the Business Management department of the Public 
University of Navarre with whom I collaborated in the final phase of the sample data 
gathering (November 2017- June 2018). The sample consists of a list of 358 LBOs over 
Spanish firms carried out between 2000 and 2011. It contains detailed accounting 
information on the acquired companies taken from the SABI database. The sample compiles 
information for a period ranging from 2 years before the buyout and 5 years post-buyout. 
Using this unique dataset, we are able to study patterns of a representative sample in Spain.   
The sample is divided into three categories considering the trajectory followed once the LBO 
has taken place. The first one includes cases in which a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) entity 
has not been created (n=75, 21%). An SPV entity was set in 283 cases (80%), 176 of which 
(49%) were subsequently followed by a forward merger7. The second group includes LBO 
cases in which an SPV entity was set but was not followed by a forward merger. In the 
remaining cases a forward merger occurs either the very first year after the LBO or later. For 
analysis purposes, we are going to use the last category (i.e. LBO followed by a forward 
merger) as it is the most adequate and representative case for understanding the implications 
of an LBO in the target company.   
                                                 
7 A forward merger occurs when a merger process in which the SPV takes over the target company follows 
the execution of the LBO. Forward mergers are perfect for transferring the aggressive effects of the purchase 
to the target company.  
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A control sample has been also constructed for which each target company has been matched 
up with a firm of similar size and industrial sector that had not been acquired in an LBO. 
This allows us to see whether the behaviors observed in the targets’ sample are specifically 
driven by the LBO.   
6.2. Variable measurement and definition  
  
In choosing with variables to focus on, we started with a baseline study of the data gathered 
by the private equity literature. A listing of the variables used in the empirical analysis along 
with its definitions is provided in Table 2; all correspond to accounting-based performance 
measures. All variables are computed for both the target companies and the control sample.   
Table 2: Variables used and their descriptions.   
 Variables  Definition  
  
EBITDA  
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization  
Sales  Firms’ total sales  
Days Accounts  
Receivables  
Days of accounts receivable outstanding  
Days Accounts Payables  Days of accounts payable outstanding  
  
Days Inventory  
Days of inventory on hand  
Tangibles  Firm’s total tangibles  
Number of employees  Firm’s total number of employees  
  
LBO  
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm underwent a buyout; 0  
otherwise  
POST  Dummy variable that is equal to 1 in the period post LBO; 0 otherwise  
BUILDUP  Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is part of a buildup; 0  
otherwise  
Source: Own elaboration  
Consistent with the aim of studying the five scenarios, the growth rate of these variables is 
computed on a time window of 7 years around the investment date (t-2; t5). This seems 
reasonable because it allows the evaluation of a firm’s performance over a long enough time 
period after the deal has been made. Year 0 is the year where the LBO is recorded in the 
financial statements. As firms exit private equity control, they exit the sample.  
7. METHODOLOGY   
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To test the hypotheses under study and to provide new evidence regarding the pattern 
followed by the variables related to operational and strategic performance of LBOs, we 
specifically track LBO investment and operational measures from two full years 
preacquisition to at most five years post-acquisition. However, as cash management is also 
important, we study the effect of LBO on working capital management too.   
Following the value generation framework (Berg & Gottschalg, 2005) and with the purpose 
of formalizing our tests, we perform the following regression, that compare operational, 
strategic and working capital management measures of LBO firms with the matched control 
group:   
Yjt= j + 0 LBOjt + 1POSTjt+ 𝛽1POSTjt * LBOj + jt  
where j is a firm index, t a time (year) index and Yjt is the performance variable. If firm j is an 
LBO target, POSTjt equals one after the deal and zero before.   
We use 7 outcome variables to examine LBOs that include primarily operating performance 
and profitability measures, investment and working capital management measures. 
Combined, they allow for a fair presentation of the LBO operating and strategic process. We 
study and test the effect of LBO on operating performance in contrast with that of those 
control firms and thus, the most relevant variable for our analysis is 𝛽1 as it provides 
information on this incremental effect on the control group.   
Previous literature has not distinguished the cases in which build-ups8 emerge. This can 
nonetheless bias the results given that the accounting information would be the aggregation 
of more than two firms and the variables are likely to be higher than in normal circumstances.   
Considering the importance of its effects in the final results, we have eliminated those cases 
from our analysis.   
8. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
  
In this section we present the results of the several tests performed. We run multiple tests 
with varying post-LBO periods in order to test for robustness of the results. Table 3 Panel 
A shows the results where POST is a dummy that equals one if periods fall into the 
postacquisition period and defined as period +1 and period +2 after the LBO and equals 
                                                 
8 A build-up strategy is when a company expands its operations by acquiring a platform company and then 
acquires one or more companies to build out and grow the platform. It is an attractive approach due to the 
relatively short holding periods employed by private equity.  
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zero if periods are one or two years before the LBO. Table 3 Panel B shows the results when 
the post-acquisition period is enlarged to period +4 and Table 3 Panel C when the post- 
acquisition period comprises the five years (until t5). In all cases period 0 is omitted. Similarly, 
Table 4 Panels A, B and C shows the results of the working capital management tests for the 
different time periods.  
Regarding operating performance, we do not find evidence of any post-LBO improvements 
in EBITDA. We do not find any statistically significant effect of an LBO (see Table 3 Panels 
A, B and C) and therefore we do not find evidence on signaling purposes trough EBITDA 
in any of the periods. Evidence suggests nevertheless that sales are negatively affected by 
LBO transactions in 32.9 percentage points the first two years after the LBO (Panel A) and 
by 33 percentage points in the window between t-2 and t4 (Panel B).   
Even though we do not find statistical evidence of a change in EBITDA, we do it in sales, 
and therefore we can conclude that LBOs are breaking the degree of operating leverage 
(DOL) model9. The lower increase in the number of employees in comparison with the 
control group, provides evidence on one of the cost-cutting measures adopted by LBOs that 
despite the fact that sales are negatively affected, avoids altering EBITDA so badly. We find 
a statistically significant negative effect of an LBO up to 59.2 % (Panel B) on the number of 
employees, which is suggestive of the fact that they are sustaining EBITDA thanks to a break 
in the DOL model.  
We have also included tangible assets as a proxy to measure investment tendencies and we 
find a statistically significant negative effect in tangible assets in any of the regressions that 
at most reaches 44.5 (Panel A) percentage points. Considering the lack of improvement in 
operating indicators such as EBITDA in any of the periods studied, we can conclude that 
Jensen’s value creation theory (Scenario 1) is contradicted. By contrast, these results are more 
consistent with the wealth expropriation hypothesis (Scenario 2), in which the intentions 
behind the negative effect in investment is just cash generation and not increasing 
performance, not even as signaling point.   
Table 3. Operating and investing performance pre and post-acquisition.  
  
                                                 
9 The DOL measures the sensitiveness of the operating profit (EBITDA, in this case) given a certain 
variation in sales. It also defines the cost structure chosen by a company at a certain moment in which risk 
might be introduced trough fixed costs that can positively impact the company.  
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Panel A: (-2 , -1 ) : (+1 , +2 )  
    
EBITDA Sales  
Tangible 
Assets  
Number of 
Employees  
LBO  
-1.551 
[1.679]  
  
1.611 [0.109]  
  
-0.048 
[0.134]  
  
0.368*** 
[0.119]  
  
POST  
-1.017  
[1.808]  
  
0.544***  
[0.118]  
  
0.751***  
[0.144]  
  
0.534***  
[0.128]  
  
  
LBOxPOST  
  
-1.386 
[2.431]  
  
  
-0.329** 
[0.159]  
  
  
-0.445**  
[0.194]  
  
  
-0.484***  
[0.194]  
  
Constant  
3.935*** 
[1.156]  
9.922*** 
[0.076]  
8.229*** 
[0.091]  
4.711*** 
[0.082]  
LBOs  244  243  244  230  
Observations  1,951  1,940  1,951  1,839  
R2  0,15  2,01  1,76  3,39  
Panel B: (-2 , -1 ) : (+3 , +4 )   
    
EBITDA Sales  
Tangible 
Assets  
Number of 
Employees  
LBO  
-1.551 
[1.465]  
  
0.161 
[0.103]  
  
-0.048 
[0.133]  
  
0.368*** 
[0.119]  
  
POST  
-1.056  
[1.377]  
  
  
0.573***  
[0.103]  
  
  
0.754***  
[0.125]  
  
  
0.582***  
[0.108]  
  
  
  
LBOxPOST  
-0.849 
[1.848]  
  
-0.330** 
[0.138]  
  
-0.415** 
[0.168]  
  
-0.592***  
[0.149]  
  
Constant  
3.935***  
[1.009]  
9.922***  
[0.076]  
8.229***  
[0.091]  
4.711***  
[0.082]  
LBOs  233  232  233  222  
Observations  2,796  2,784  2,796  2,666  
R2  0,14  2,26  1,77  4,10  
Panel C: (-2 , -1 ) : ( +3 ,+4 ,+5 )  
    
EBITDA Sales  
Tangible 
Assets  
Number of 
Employees  
LBO  
-1.551  
[3.309]  
0.161  
[0.109]  
-0.048  
[0.133]  
0.368***  
[0.119]  
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POST  
  
-1.209  
[2.109]  
  
  
0.581***  
[0.099]  
  
  
0.752***  
[0.121]  
  
  
0.592***  
[0.108]  
  
  
LBOxPOST  
  
-0.558 
[2.823]  
  
  
-0.322** 
[0.133]  
  
  
-0.408** 
[0.163]  
  
  
-0.499***  
[0.145]  
  
Constant  
3.935*** 
[1.589]  
9.922*** 
[0.075]  
8.229*** 
[0.091]  
4.711*** 
[0.082]  
LBOs  227  226  227  217  
Observations  3,171  3,158  3,171  3,038  
R2  0,08  2,23  1,68  4,17  
Notes:  Estimates are OLS estimates. The variables are defined as follows: EBITDA: EBITDA scaled 
by tangible assets; Sales: the log of sales; Tangible assets: the log of tangible assets; Number of 
employees: the log of the number of employees; Asset Turnover: the log of asset turnover. Standard 
errors for marginal effects are in parentheses and statistical significance is indicated by * p < 0.1, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01.    
Considering that wealth expropriation consists mostly of funneling cash out of the company 
and provided that not enough information is available regarding the cash flow statement, we 
have also studied the working capital management effect of LBOs so as to search for 
evidence on operating cash generation without a positive EBITDA. The results are shown 
in Table 4. None of the three variables chosen provides significant statistically evidence on 
working capital management efficiency relative to controls (Panel A, B and C).  We can 
therefore conclude that private equity-controlled firms do not generate excess operating cash 
flows through working capital management neither in any of the periods.   
Table 4. Working capital management pre and post-acquisition.  
  
 
Panel A: (-2 , -1 ) : (+1 , +2 )  
   Days Inventory  Days Accounts Receivable  Days Accounts Payable  
 
LBO  
1.156  
[183.18]  
  
19.656  
[27.12]  
  
-3.542  
[10.499]  
  
POST  
-7.268  
[194.92]  
  
-40.433  
[29.18]  
  
4.280  
[11.01]  
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LBOxPOST  
Constant  
  
253.525  
[264.58]  
  
55.815  
[127.55]  
  
51.148  
[39.29]  
  
144.519***  
[18.70]  
  
-14.233 [14.91]  
  
74.041*** [7.29]  
LBOs  209  242  210  
Observations  1,666  1,936  1,673  
R2  0.17  0.11  0.08  
Panel B: (-2 , -
1 
  
 ) : (+3 , +4 ) 
Days Inventory    
Days Accounts Receivable  
Days Accounts Payable  
LBO  
1.156  
[469.92]  
19.656 [48.08]  -3.542  
[9.499]  
POST  
  
-8.601  
[437.61]  
  
  
-48.84  
[45.16]  
  
  
-1.074  
 [8.73]  
  
  
LBOxPOST  
  
557.029  
[592.06]  
  
  
97.85  
[60.64]  
  
  
-12.91  
[11.80]  
  
Constant  
55.815  
[327.22]  
144.519*** [33.15]  74.041*** [6.59]  
LBOs  199  231  203  
Observations  2,383  2,776  2,435  
R2  0.15  0.17  0.17  
Panel C: (-2 , -1 ) : ( +3 ,+4 ,+5 )  
  Days Inventory  Days Accounts Receivable  
Days Accounts Payable  
LBO  
1.156  
[441.07]  
  
19.656  
[46.49]  
  
-3.542  
[9.173]  
  
POST  
-8.772  
[399.46]  
  
  
-50.78  
[42.47]  
  
  
-1.914  
 [8.20]  
  
  
  
LBOxPOST  
451.64  
[538.97]  
  
96.63*  
[56.88]  
  
-12.69  
[11.07]  
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Constant  
55.815  
[307.13]  
144.519*** [32.06]  74.041*** 
[6.37]  
LBOs  193  225  198  
Observations  2,706  3,149  2,774  
R2  0.12  0.18  0.19  
 
Notes: Estimates are OLS estimates. The dependent variables include: Days Inv: days of inventory on 
hand defined as inventory/sales*365; Days AR: days of accounts receivable outstanding defined as 
accounts receivable/sales*365; Days AP: days of accounts payables outstanding defined as accounts 
payable/sales*365. Standard errors for marginal effects are in parentheses and statistical significance 
is indicated by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.    
On the contrary and considering the negative effect on investments, we could conclude that 
an important mechanism for cash generation is either the disposal of assets or the lower 
growth in investments. The resulting cash inflows are resources that other companies employ 
in productive investments and that these others use for expropriation purposes. Even though 
this gives rise to positive investing cash flow, according to the operating results in which no 
evidence is found about operating profit margin improvements, Jensen’s (1986) theory is 
again contradicted. The arguments of the official narrative claiming the elimination of 
inefficient investments to improve operating margins are then refuted. It is then clear that 
the results are more consistent with wealth expropriation (Scenario 2) than with value 
creation (Scenario 1), but what about the presence of short-termism?   
As described in Section 5 two possibilities can arise when thinking about short-termism. Not 
evidence is found neither on short-termism in the form of signaling (Scenario 3) or 
exhaustion (Scenario 4) as not significant changes in EBITDA take place in any of the 
periods. There are no signs of signaling intentions as no statistical findings arise in any of the 
periods studied.   
Lastly, the growth scenario is not present neither according to these results.  Not only does 
EBITDA not change but investments are also negatively affected and therefore, no evidence 
is found on negative short-term performance indicators with long-term oriented aims.  
In sum, we do not reject the expropriation hypothesis (i.e. Scenario 2) but we do reject the 
other four, which is suggestive of the wealth expropriation transferred from the acquired 
firms to the private equity sponsors. There is some evidence however on the limits of 
expropriation. The negative effects of LBOs on the number of employees and the amount 
of tangible assets is reduced on year 5 (Table 3 Panel C) in comparison with the two first 
post-acquisition years, suggesting that these cost-cutting and disinvesting strategies are 
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exhausted. These are measures that help the company generate cash in the short-term but 
that once they reach their maximum, they do not serve longer and that harm the company 
sustainability.   
9. CONCLUSIONS  
  
So far, all the purposes contemplated at the beginning have been covered. In this project we 
have tried to theorize about the concept of short-termism, starting from the market and 
extending its presence to a financial industry especially related with private firms, the private 
equity industry.    
We have used a comprehensive sample of the financial statements of Spanish private equity 
buyouts from 2001 to 2011 to test five different scenarios. We have found that in the 
postacquisition period these firms experience a reduction in sales, assets and employee’s 
growth and we do not find evidence of any post-LBO improvements in EBITDA. With 
these results we reject four of the hypotheses tested but we do not reject the expropriation 
scenario, that is, private equity sponsors transfer wealth from the target company for their 
own benefit. According to our vision of short-termism (i.e. based on signaling), we cannot 
conclude that they sacrifice long-term in exchange for short-term profits.  
No evidence indicates that the mechanisms described by the official narrative (e.g. Jensen 
(1986)), increase the profitability of the underlying assets. Questioning their contentions, we 
can think about the need for further regulation in the private equity industry (starting from 
the Spanish one). The lack of more severe rules could be one of the causes that leads to these 
adverse outcomes. The social implications are also relevant as the results suggest that few are 
benefiting at the expense of many. The first step would be to increase the consciousness on 
how these firms work and what they really do, and this project might shed light in this sense.  
There are nonetheless many different topics that are out of this project and would be 
interesting to review. The analysis could be completed by studying how the financial function 
affects these results as well as the evolution of target companies’ performance after the LBO. 
At the theoretical level, researchers, and in particular those against the benefits of LBOs, 
should focus on distinguishing between short-termism and expropriation. During the 
expounding of this project, we have confirmed our first insights and we conclude that few 
has been theorized about it. This project questions appealing topics for further research.   
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